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Abstract
It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal
by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee
perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by
rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I
show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.
1. Introduction: Accepting as Intending and Rational Symmetry
Cyril promises to make Salah breakfast. Since promises aren’t impositions, Salah
can accept or reject Cyril’s promise.1 Salah, prospectively peckish, accepts. What’s
involved in Salah’s acceptance? According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, by
accepting Cyril’s promise Salah intends that Cyril make him breakfast.2 Roth calls
this view, naturally enough, Accepting as Intending, and offers several arguments
in its favor. Here, I’m interested only in one, and only as background. As we’ll see,
∗Thanks to Patrick Connolly, Finnur Dellse´n, Luke Elson, John Lawless, and Daniel Layman
for feedback on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for their
thoughtful comments.
1See Thomson (1990) and Roth (2016, esp. §I).
2Roth (2016, esp. §II, p. 92 and following). Technically, intending the promisor’s action is one
part of what the promisee does. The second part involves communicating the intention. Here,
my focus is on the intentional aspect of acceptance; the communicative aspect doesn’t affect my
argument. So, in what follows, I’ll say that accepting a promise just is intending the promisor’s
action.
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2Roth’s argument intuitively supports Accepting as Intending; but it simultaneously
provides the materials for generating two related problems for the view.
A quick proviso. In this paper, I’m in the business of causing trouble for Ac-
cepting as Intending. You might already have doubts. For instance, you might
worry about the notion of one agent intending another agent’s action. For the sake
of argument, in this paper I’ll assume the proponent of Accepting as Intending can
reassure us on all such matters. Even with the fully articulated view in front of us,
I’ll argue it faces two problems.
To begin: the relevant argumentative backdrop has two stages. First, we notice
that promissory acceptance is subject to rational requirements strikingly similar to
those governing intention. Next, we infer to the best explanation of this similarity
that accepting a promise just is intending. Let’s look at this idea in more detail,
starting with the similarities exhibited by promissory acceptance and intention.
Two similarities are particularly illustrative, one of which starts from the side of
promissory acceptance, and the other from the side of intention.
First, from the side of promissory acceptance: it’s irrational, we observe, to
simultaneously accept mutually inconsistent promises, where this is a matter of
the impossibility of both promised actions being performed.3 It’s irrational, for
instance, for Salah to simultaneously accept Cyril’s promise to make him break-
fast and Jack ’s promise to make him breakfast, on the assumption that it’s not
possible for Salah to be made two breakfasts. (Salah isn’t a hobbit.) Now, we
notice that intention is itself subject to a consistency requirement: it’s irrational
to simultaneously intend mutually inconsistent actions, where this is a matter of
the impossibility of both actions being performed.4 So, that’s the first striking
similarity: both promissory acceptance and intention are subject to consistency
requirements.
Second, from the side of intention: it’s irrational to intend an action and fail to
intend the (known) necessary means for that action. For instance, it’s irrational for
Cyril to intend to cook Salah breakfast but fail to intend to slice bread, assuming
slicing bread is necessary to cook Salah breakfast. Now, we notice that promissory
acceptance is itself subject to a means-ends coherence requirement: it’s irrational
for Salah to accept Cyril’s promise to cook him breakfast knowing that in order for
Cyril to do so Salah must tell Cyril where the eggs are, and for Salah not to intend
to point Cyril to the eggs.5 So, that’s the second striking similarity: both intention
3Roth (2016, p. 96).
4Roth (2016, p. 96). See also Bratman (1987); Harman (1986), both cited in Roth (2016).
5Roth (2016, p. 97).
3and promissory acceptance are subject to means-ends coherence requirements.
In the second stage of the argument, we ask: What explains these striking simi-
larities in the rational requirements governing promissory acceptance and intention?
The answer, supposing Accepting as Intending, is elegant and straightforward: since
promissory acceptance is simply a special instance of intention, it’s no surprise the
former is governed by rational requirements similar to those governing the latter.
Hence we receive inductive support for Accepting as Intending.
This argument, so put, looks pretty good. But this way of putting the argument,
in terms of rational requirements “similar” or “like” each other, and an elegant ex-
planation thereof, radically understates Accepting as Intending’s commitments on
this front.6 This is because the thesis that’s meant to enjoy support from the argu-
ment is that accepting a promise to φ is identical to the promisee’s intending that
the promisor φ. Hence if Accepting as Intending is true, it’s not just that ratio-
nal requirements on promissory acceptance and intention are strikingly similar, it’s
that they’re (strikingly) identical. So we might begin by noticing striking similari-
ties between rational requirements governing promissory acceptance and intention,
but Accepting as Intending in fact entails something much stronger, viz. the same
rational requirements govern the two.
This is a strong claim. It means that, for any true claim about the rationality
of intending that A φ, there will be a paraphrastic true claim about the rationality
of accepting A’s promise that A φ. The trouble, as I’ll argue, is Accepting as
Intending’s commitment to this strong claim. Hence I’m happy to accept, for the
sake of argument, that promissory acceptance and intention are subject to strikingly
similar rational requirements. What I’ll argue is that promissory acceptance and
intention are not subject to exactly the same rational requirements, in the way
Accepting as Intending is committed to thinking they are.
My argument, like the argument just canvassed, proceeds in two stages. In the
first (§2), I’ll present two problems for the view. In the second (§3), I’ll diagnose
the problems. The idea, then, is that the problems make us suspicious of Accepting
as Intending, and the diagnosis confirms our suspicions. I’ll conclude by considering
six replies to my arguments (§4).
6For Roth’s statement using this language, see Roth (2016, pp. 96-7).
42. Two Problems for Accepting as Intending
The problems I’m interested in involve cases where the rational requirements gov-
erning accepting a promise to φ and intending that the promisor φ come apart. In
particular, I’ll argue that Accepting as Intending delivers counterintuitive verdicts
regarding the reasons promisors and promisees have. To that end, consider two
principles. First:
Intend-Promote: If S intends that A φ, and S’s ψ-ing promotes A’s
φ-ing, then there is a reason for S to (intend to) ψ.
Intend-Promote is an uncontroversial principle that says there’s reason to (intend
to) do what promotes what one intends.7 Now consider:
Accept-Promote: If S accepts A’s promise to φ, and S’s ψ-ing pro-
motes A’s φ-ing, then there is a reason for S to (intend to) ψ.
Accept-Promote follows from the conjunction of Accepting as Intending and Intend-
Promote: if accepting a promise to φ just is intending the promisor φ, and there’s
reason to do what promotes what one intends, then there’s reason to do what
promotes what one accepts a promisor’s promise to do. Accept-Promote is a para-
phrastic instance of Intend-Promote: it’s what we get by replacing ‘intends that
A φ’ with ‘accepts A’s promise to φ.’ According to Accepting as Intending, this
should be licit, since accepting A’s promise to φ just is intending that A φ. But it
isn’t licit. The trouble, as I’ll now explain, is that Accept-Promote delivers coun-
terintuitive results. There are two closely related kinds of problematic results, and
hence two corresponding problems. The first is easiest to see from the side of the
promisee, the second from the side of the promisor. I’ll take each in turn.
Consider, first, Salah’s situation having accepted Cyril’s promise to make him
breakfast. Suppose Salah’s slicing bread promotes Cyril’s making breakfast. It
turns out, then, that (given Accept-Promote) Salah has reason to slice bread.8
7But see §4.1 for some qualifications. It’s worth noting there is controversy over the idea of
promoting an intention (or desire). See, for instance, Behrends and DiPaolo (2011); Lin (2016);
Sharadin (2015a,b). We can safely ignore this controversy at present. We might think of Intend-
Promote as a specific version of what Roth (2016, p. 97). calls the “means-ends coherence”
requirement on intention.
8I’m supposing slicing the bread isn’t itself a part of making breakfast, but that it does promote,
i.e., make it more likely (see fn. 7), that Cyril will (successfully) make him breakfast. If intuitions
differ, the case can be modified: perhaps what Salah does is ensure there’s sufficient gas in the
propane tank – this is clearly not in any ordinary sense part of making breakfast but it promotes
Cyril’s doing so. Alternately, the case presented in §3, where it’s not at all plausible that the
promisee’s actions are part of the promisor’s φ-ing.
5Examples multiply: Salah has reason to do many things he didn’t previously have
reason to do. But these results are counterintuitive: Why is Salah, having accepted
Cyril’s promise, now in possession of reasons to help Cyril make breakfast? It’s
not just that Salah’s reason to slice bread is outweighed by his reasons to do other
things. It’s that, intuitively, he has no reason at all to slice bread. More precisely:
He has no reason to do so because he has accepted Cyril’s promise to make him
breakfast. Most precisely: He has no reason to do so in virtue of accepting Cyril’s
promise. Promissory acceptance doesn’t itself generate reasons for Salah to do what
promotes Cyril’s keeping his promise. Imagine Salah was deliberating about what
to do while awaiting his meal, and we told Salah that, if he had no more pressing
matters to attend to, he should slice bread. He’d surely complain: “Cyril promised
to make breakfast for me! I don’t have any reason to help!” And that complaint
seems exactly right.
Now, it’s true Accept-Promote doesn’t tell us how strong the reason is that
Salah has, in virtue of accepting Cyril’s promise, to help. And it’s implausible to
suppose the reason is maximally weighty, i.e., outweighs all other reasons Salah has.
But it’s equally implausible to suppose the reason is minimally weighty, i.e., is itself
outweighed by all other reasons Salah has. So, there will be cases where his reason
to help is at least strong enough to be taken into account in deliberation, and might
even be decisive with respect to what he should do. And that’s all we need for
the counterintuitive result: Salah doesn’t have any reason to help Cyril make him
breakfast in virtue of accepting Cyril’s promise to do so.9
I’ll call cases such as this promisee-enlisting problems. Promisee-enlisting prob-
lems arise because, if accepting a promisor’s promise to φ just is intending that the
promisor φ, the promisee can be rationally enlisted in helping the promisor φ via
the quite general fact (Intend-Promote) that there’s reason to do what promotes
what one intends.
A clarification about the intended scope of this problem: the counterintuitive
result is not that it’s never the case that, having accepted a promise to φ, a promisee
now has reason to do something she didn’t previously have reason to do. For
example, if it’s necessary for Salah to tell Cyril where the eggs are in order for Cyril
to make Salah breakfast, then it’s reasonable to suppose Salah has a reason he
didn’t have before, in virtue of accepting Cyril’s promise, to point Cyril to the eggs.
Instead, the counterintuitive result is that it’s not always the case that, having
accepted a promise to φ, a promisee now has reasons to do anything at all that
9Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point.
6would promote the promisor’s φ-ing.10 Before diagnosing the promisee-enlisting
problem, let’s consider the second problem for Accepting as Intending, this time
from the side of the promisor.
Suppose some further details about the Salah and Cyril’s case. Suppose there
are other guests in the house – Jack and Jess – and that Cyril is lazy. Suppose
Cyril has just promised to make Salah breakfast (Salah accepted) and realizes it’d
be great to have a sous-chef. What should Cyril do? What he should do, if he’s
rational, is promise everyone he can that he’ll make Salah breakfast, hoping they’ll
accept. For, if they do, they’ll then have reason to do what promotes Cyril’s keeping
his promise. (This is so for the same reasons Salah acquired such reasons, in the
promisee-enlisting problem above.) And others having reason to help will presum-
ably promote Cyril’s own end of making Salah breakfast. So, given Intend-Promote,
there’s a reason for Cyril to promise Jack and Jess that he’ll make Salah breakfast.
Assuming it’s relatively costless to do so, Cyril should actually promise Jack and
Jess that he’ll make Salah breakfast. If any (hopefully: both!) accept, there’ll
thereby be reasons (via Accept-Promote) for Jack and Jess each to do what’ll pro-
mote Cyril’s making Salah breakfast, e.g., heating the oven, slicing the bread, etc.
Sous-chefs acquired!
But, again, this is very counterintuitive: Why should it be rational for Cyril,
having promised Salah to make him breakfast, to now promise Jack and Jess that
he’ll make Salah breakfast? The subject of his promise is properly Salah, not Jack
and Jess. It’s not that Cyril’s reasons to promise Jack and Jess are somehow
outweighed by other reasons. It’s that, intuitively, he has no reason at all, having
promised Salah, to go on to promise Jack and Jess. At least, he has no reason to do
so in virtue of having initially promised Salah. Imagine Salah hearing of such further
promises. He’d surely complain: “You already promised me! Why are you going
about making further promises regarding my meal?” That complaint seems, again,
exactly right. I’ll call cases such as this over-promising problems for Accepting as
Intending. Over-promising problems arise because, if accepting someone’s promise
to φ is intending that the promisor φ, there will be reason (via Intend-Promote) for
the promisor to make her promise to as many agents as she reasonably can, hoping
that (i) they’ll accept and (ii) thereby be rationally enlisted (via Accept-Promote)
into helping her φ.
Below, I’ll consider six replies to the promisee-enlisting and over-promising prob-
lems. But first I’ll try to diagnose what’s causing the problems. Doing so will pro-
10I discuss this in further detail below (§§3 and 4.2).
7vide some theoretical weight to the intuitive doubt cast on Accepting as Intending
by the cases.
3. Diagnosing the Problems
Let’s begin with the promisee-enlisting problem. It’s often observed that intending
to φ closes deliberation about whether to φ and that this is part of the functional
role, or point, of intention in our cognitive economy.11 Intention enables us to cease
deliberation about whether to φ and begin deliberation about how to φ. To this
we can add, and it sometimes is added: it’s a good thing we can intend in this
manner, else we dither endlessly over what ends to pursue. Something similar is
true of promising, and in particular of accepting a promise. Let me explain.
Suppose I book a flight. In order to make my flight, I must get to the airport by
noon, and so I intend to do so. I must now figure out how to get to the airport by
noon. Options present themselves: I could walk (exhausting), bike (cumbersome),
hitchhike (dangerous), take a taxi (expensive), take a shuttle (crowded), use Uber
(unethical?). I’m thinking aloud. You overhear, and offer to get me to the airport
by noon. I tell you it’s very important I not miss the flight. You seek to reassure
me: “I promise to get you there by noon.” Reassured, I accept your promise. Of
course, I’m not done planning for the trip: there’s more deliberation to come. But
something important is now true of my subsequent deliberations.
One thing that’s true, we should all agree, is that I can now close off my
deliberations regarding getting to the airport. It’s settled: you’re giving me a
ride. I can turn my attention to packing, booking hotels, etc. Assuming I don’t
have reason to doubt the sincerity of your promise, or your ability to fulfill it, the
question of how to get to the airport is no longer open for me. That area of action
is, as it were, outsourced: by accepting your promise, I’ve ceded responsibility for
my getting to the airport to you.
This phenomenon, whereby accepting a promisor’s promise that she’ll φ is a way
of the promisee’s outsourcing responsibility for φ-ing onto the promisor, and thereby
closing off questions about how to φ in the promisee’s deliberation, isn’t uncommon
or unfamiliar. It’s a paradigmatic description of what happens, at the level of the
promisee’s deliberations, when a promisee accepts a promise. We can put this, in
harmony with the oft-observed claim about intention noted above, in terms of the
functional role, or point, accepting a promise plays in our cognitive economy: like
11C.f. Bratman (1984, 1987); Holton (2008).
8intending, it’s a way of closing off deliberation about φ-ing. Intention closes off
deliberation about whether to φ, and accepting someone’s promise to φ closes off
deliberations about how φ-ing shall be achieved: the promisor is now responsible
for φ-ing.
But, and here’s the point, if Accepting as Intending is correct, then what I do
when I accept your promise is form some further intention, viz. that you get me
to the airport by noon. But that’s not a way of closing off deliberation about how
I shall get to the airport! For now I might well concern myself with executing this
further intention; I now have reason to fill your car with gas, to put directions in
your mailbox, and, quite generally, to do what will promote your getting me to the
airport. The point here is not that I can’t intend for you to get me to the airport.
Of course I can do that. The point is that when you promise to get me to the
airport and I accept, what paradigmatically happens is that I can then ignore the
details of how this will be accomplished, trusting you to do what it takes. But if
what I do in accepting your promise is thereby intend that you’ll do it, I’m still –
indeed, ipso facto – responsible for achieving the promised action. In other words,
I’ve been enlisted in executing the promise, simply by accepting it. If Accepting as
Intending is correct, accepting a promise isn’t a way of outsourcing the promised
action: it’s instead a (somewhat complicated) way of enlisting the promisor into the
project of achieving the promised action without – and this is crucial – de-enlisting
the promisee.
Here is another way to put the point: once I intend to fly, I thereby acquire reason
to do what promotes my flying. Why? Because of Intend-Promote. But by the same
token, once I accept your promise to take me to the airport and – if Acceptance
as Intending is correct – thereby intend you to take me to the airport, I thereby
acquire reason to make sure your car is filled with gas, to send you reminders, etc.
In short: to do what promotes your taking me to the airport. Why? Because of the
very same principle, i.e., Intend-Promote. So, the problem I’m highlighting here is
that, if accepting your promise to get me to the airport is just a matter of forming
another intention, then I’ll have reason to do all manner of things I intuitively have
no reason to do regarding your fulfillment of your promise in virtue of forming this
new intention for you to fulfill it. That’s the counterintuitive result.
Below I’ll consider replies to this idea, including the reply that promises to φ
are (implicitly) promises to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee. But first, let’s
turn to the over-promising problem. The theoretical trouble is more subtle, and
hence more difficult to see, in the over-promising problem. It’s easiest to see from
9the side of the promisee. So that’s where I’ll begin.
Promising generates moral obligation: having promised to φ, the promisor is
now morally obligated, to the promisee, to φ. In other words, promising enjoins
a new normative relationship between promisor and promisee with respect to the
promisor’s φ-ing. One aspect of this relationship is that if the promisor fails to
φ the promisee has a distinctive moral complaint available to her not available to
other agents. The promisee can, in virtue of having been promised, appropriately
direct a distinctive kind of moral blame, or resentment, to the promisor for her
failure to φ. Agents other than the promisee might, of course, be in a position to
issue a generalized moral complaint toward the promisor for her failure to keep a
promise, in the same way any agent is positioned to condemn other agents’ failures
to fulfill their moral obligations. The point here is that promisees stand in a special
position to direct a distinctive complaint to their promisors, and this is because
promisees are the ones who were promised. Now, standing in this relationship, being
situated to make this special complaint, doesn’t theoretically preclude other agents
from standing in a symmetrical relationship. Others might also be in a position
to complain in the same distinctive way about an agent’s failure to φ since, after
all, it’s possible for a promisor to make the same promise to multiple promisees.
However, ordinarily, when someone promises you she’ll φ, you naturally expect to
be the only one so situated, unless you know, or suspect, that she has, or will,
similarly promise others that she’ll φ.
But here’s the odd thing: given Accepting as Intending, this natural expectation
– that when someone promises you she’ll φ, she’s thereby enjoined a significant
normative relationship between just you and her – is radically mistaken. For it’s
always rational for the promisor to promise any promisees she reasonably expects to
accept. By doing so, she hopes to enlist them, via Accept-Promote, in executing her
promise. By doing so, she also enjoins the same normative relationship between
subsequent promisees and herself as that enjoined by promising you. Moreover,
given Accepting as Intending, this isn’t only possible, you should expect it to occur.
Whenever someone promises you she’ll φ, you should expect, ceteris paribus, she’ll
also promise others she’ll φ. And this seems wrong. Being promised, and accepting
someone’s promise, seems personal, intimate, in a way that’s disrupted when it’s
accompanied by the thought that the promisor will soon be off to make the same
promise to others when she’s done with you. To reiterate: the problem is not
that it’s possible, or even likely in some cases, that a promise has more than one
promisee. The problem is that while it’s natural to think of this as the exception
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to the rule, Accepting as Intending says it is the rule.
So: Accepting as Intending doesn’t do justice to the significance of the normative
relationship a promisee naturally expects is enjoined between the promisor and
herself, since it not only allows for that same relationship to be enjoined between
the promisor and other promisees – something all should allow – it also makes the
proliferation of the relationship ubiquitous – and that’s quite odd indeed. It’s odd
because, in promising, absent reasons to think otherwise, we naturally expect to
uniquely stand in this special relationship with a promisor. But if Accepting as
Intending is correct, this natural expectation is radically mistaken. I’ll turn now to
six replies to these two problems.
4. Replies & Rejoinders
4.1. Accepting as Intending isn’t committed to Accept-Promote
Reply: Both the promisee-enlisting and the over-promising problem rely on Accept-
Promote, i.e., the principle that says if you accept someone’s promise to φ, and ψ-ing
promotes her φ-ing, then there’s reason for you to ψ. But: Accepting as Intending
isn’t committed to Accept-Promote. So, Accepting as Intending faces neither prob-
lem.
Rejoinder: Accepting as Intending is committed to Accept-Promote. Recall how
we arrived at Accept-Promote, viz. via Intend-Promote. Intend-Promote is an
uncontroversial principle about the reasons agents have to do what promotes what
they intend. I say uncontroversial, but we might quibble over the details. I’m happy
to admit that Intend-Promote might require modification. But such modification
does not materially change the facts on the ground. For corresponding to each
modification of Intend-Promote there’s a version of Accept-Promote entailed by
the combination of Intend-Promote and Accepting as Intending. These versions
of Accept-Promote are trivial to generate: simply replace ‘intends that A φ’ with
‘accepts A’s promise to φ.’ So, while insisting on modifying Intend-Promote (and
so Accept-Promote) might belay the problematic results, it doesn’t block them.
4.2. Rejecting Accepting as Intending Leaves Unexplained Reasons
Reply: Suppose Rose promises to return a book on my behalf and I accept. Intu-
itively, I have reason to leave the book where she can find it. So, promisees some-
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times have reason to do what promotes a promisor’s φ-ing. Accepting as Intending
easily explains this: it’s because promisees always have reason to do anything that
promotes a promisor’s φ-ing. Rejecting Accepting as Intending leaves us with un-
explained reasons.12
Rejoinder: If we reject Accepting as Intending, as I’m urging, we can nonetheless
explain such reasons by appeal to a familiar feature of promises. Here is how that
explanation goes: sometimes (perhaps often) some (but not all) promise-promoting
actions on the part of a promisee are implicitly included as conditions of the promise.
In our example, Rose’s promise to return the book on my behalf is (implicitly) a
promise to return the book conditional on my providing her with the book (or
at least not hiding it from her). On this way of understanding things, accepting
Rose’s promise means I’ll either provide her with the book (and then she’s obliged
to return it) or that I won’t (and she’s free of any obligation to do so). Assuming I
want Rose obligated to return the book on my behalf, I then have reason to provide
her the book.13 But, intuitively, her promise isn’t (implicitly) a promise to return
the book conditional on, e.g., my driving her to the library, sending her reminder
emails, etc. That is why I don’t have any reason to do such things, having accepted
Rose’s promise, despite the facts that (i) those things promote Rose’s returning the
book and (ii) I might have reason to do some things that promote her returning
the book.14 This isn’t an ad hoc amendment to the view that only earns its keep in
explaining the unexplained reasons: it’s a familiar idea that promises often contain
such implicit “escape clauses” or conditions, some of which involve actions on the
part of the promisee.
4.3. There Is a Restriction on Appropriate Promisees
Reply: The over-promising problem arises when a promisor extends her promise
beyond the initial promisee. But: there’s a restriction on who can be the appropri-
ate promisee of any given promise that precludes extending promises in this way.
So, Accepting as Intending doesn’t face the over-promising problem.
12Thanks to two anonymous referees for presenting versions of this reply.
13See fn. 23 for more on this point.
14What determines the conditions that are in this way implicitly involved in promises? Roughly,
convention: it’s precisely those actions it doesn’t seem odd, or counterintuitive, to think are
required of a promisee that can be understood in this way, as conditions of the original promise.
As promises differ in content, context, promisor / promisee pairs, etc. so they will vary in their
implicit conditions.
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Rejoinder: This is an attempt to block the over-promising problem by blocking the
possibility, or appropriateness, of promising further agents to φ, given that one has
already promised one particular agent to φ. I offer three related points in response.
First: It’s clearly possible to promise more than one agent to φ. The thought
behind the reply is that this is somehow inappropriate. But, at least sometimes, this
is completely appropriate. For instance, a student can promise all the members of
her dissertation committee that her thesis will be completed by term end. Moreover,
she can do so by first promising one of them, then promising the next, etc. So it
cannot be that there’s a blanket restriction, grounded in the nature of promising,
on extending promises beyond an initial promisee.
Second, and relatedly: Since it’s possible and sometimes appropriate to extend
promises to multiple promisees, the thought must be that in cases of over -promising
there’s a theoretically principled way of restricting the appropriate promisees for
any given promise. But I’m at a loss to see what such a restriction could be. It
cannot be a restriction grounded in the nature of promising. It equally cannot be
a restriction grounded in the content of particular promises, since it’s possible to
imagine contexts in which promises with those contents are appropriately extended
to further promisees. So, I’m not optimistic about the prospects for the proponent of
Accepting as Intending providing a non-ad hoc restriction that delivers the required
results. At the very least, we’re owed a story here about the relevant restriction.15
Third: Notice that this reply attempts to weaken the strongly counterintuitive
results that over-promising is always (or ever) rational. But someone who rejects
Accepting as Intending will also find these results equally counterintuitive. The
important thing is that, if one rejects Accepting as Intending, one doesn’t face this
problem. So, it does no good to point to the counterintuitive results and insist
that there must be some theoretically perspicuous way of restricting appropriate
promisees. For the opponent of Accepting as Intending will agree that there must
be some way to block the results; only, she doesn’t need to resort to specifying a
theoretical restriction on appropriate promisees to do so. She need only point to
her rejection of Accepting as Intending.
15But see §4.4-5 below for further discussion.
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4.4. Over-Promising Won’t Normally be Effective at Promoting φ-ing: Reasons-
Responsiveness
Reply: The over-promising problem only arises if it’s normally reasonable for a
promisor to think that additional promisees are rational in the sense that they are
aware of and responsive to their reasons for performing actions that are grounded
in their promissory acceptances. But this thought isn’t normally reasonable: it’s
normally unreasonable to suppose that, even if further promisees were to accept
one’s promise to φ, they would be responsive to the reasons they thereby acquire to
promote one’s φ-ing. We know this isn’t normally reasonable via our actual experi-
ence. After all, it’s not true that promisors typically go about over-promising! The
thought continues: they don’t do so because it’s an ineffective strategy for promot-
ing their promises. Hence, Accepting as Intending doesn’t face the over-promising
problem.
Rejoinder: This reply is in an odd dialectical position: the proponent and op-
ponent of Accepting as Intending agree that over-promising won’t be effective at
promoting promised actions. According to Accepting as Intending, this is because
further promisees are for some reason systematically insensitive to the reasons they
acquire via promissory acceptance to promote the promised action. According to
the opponent of Accepting as Intending, this is because accepting a promise isn’t
a matter of intending and so doesn’t generate the relevant reasons. I don’t see any
reason to prefer the former explanation to the latter. Indeed, there seems to be
a clear cost to taking the former route: it requires thinking that, at least in this
domain, agents are (for an as yet unexplained reason) systematically insensitive to
their reasons. So, if the thought is that the absence of real-life, honest-to-goodness
over-promising is explicable by Accepting as Intending, I’m happy to grant it might
be. But it’s equally explicable by the opponent of that view, since the opponent
isn’t committed to thinking it’s even possible to germinate the space of reasons via
over-promising. Moreover, the opponent of Accepting as Intending appears to have
the upper-hand in explaining the lack of actual over-promising in the wild, for she
doesn’t need to encourage pessimism about agents’ rational capacities to do so.
4.5. Over-Promising Won’t Normally be Effective at Promoting φ-ing: Non-Acceptance
Reply: Potential promisees will refuse to be “drawn in” to promises: they will
not accept the promisor’s promissory overtures. For instance, if you promise me
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your next meal will be a burrito, I might reasonably tell you to leave me out of it.
Moreover, promisors are in a position to know this. So, it won’t be reasonable for
promisors to over-promise.16
Rejoinder: My rejoinder has two parts. First: it remains possible that, sometimes,
it will be reasonable to attempt over-promising, even if it’s true that, normally, it
won’t be successful. This will be so in conditions where the attempt is relatively
costless. In my view, this remains an unacceptable result. More importantly, sec-
ond: if we reject Accepting as Intending we can agree that (i) over-promising won’t
normally be effective at promoting φ-ing and (ii) potential promisees will refuse to
be “drawn in.” And we can explain both facts: (i) is explained by the rejection of
Accepting as Intending (see §4.4). And (ii) is in turn explained by explaining po-
tential promisees’ reluctance to accept (over-) promises in terms of their reluctance
to stand in the special relationship engendered by promises to the promisor.
To elaborate on (ii): rejecting Accepting as Intending doesn’t require reject-
ing the claim that accepting a promise involves any sort of important normative
commitment. Indeed, as we saw above (§3), it’s a familiar idea that there’s a spe-
cial normative relationship engendered between a promisor and a promisee: the
promisee is in a position to direct a particular kind of moral resentment toward the
promisor should she fail in her promise. So, a possible explanation of a potential
promisee’s unwillingness to be “drawn in” to a promise is that she’s unwilling to
stand in this relationship to the promisor, at least with respect to the content of
this promise. (For instance, I might not want to put myself in a position where I
should blame you for failing to eat a burrito. And so I might ask you to “leave me
out of it” when it comes to such things.)
4.6. A promise to φ is a promise to φ-without-help-from-the-promisee
Reply: When a promisor promises to φ she implicitly promises to φ-without-any-
help-from-the-promisee. Hence a promisee’s acceptance doesn’t enlist the promisee
in φ-ing. For, anything the promisee might do to promote the promisor’s φ-ing would
obviously not promote the promisor’s φ-ing-without-any-help-from-the-promisee.
Rejoinder: Something like this idea appears to be Roth’s, when, in the course of
worrying about something a version of the promisee-enlisting problem, he says that
16Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this reply.
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Accepting as Intending can capture an important asymmetry between the promisor
and the promisee:
Surely there is such an asymmetry [between the promisor and promisee],
but it’s not hard to account for it. [...] [I]t might be implicit in the
promise (and therefore in the acceptance) that the promisor will address
everything that comes up that would need to be taken care of in order for
the promisor to φ. (“Don’t worry about it; I’ll take care of everything.
I promise.”) Thus, even though the promisee intends the promisor’s
φ-ing, the promisee doesn’t normally have to do anything.17
This idea has two problems.
First: in order for this reply to work, it must be true that normally a promisor
implicitly promises to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee. But it’s simply false
that, normally, when a promisor explicitly promises to φ what the promisor implic-
itly promises is to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee. Roth himself appears,
accidentally perhaps, to acknowledge this point. For, as Roth points out, we do
sometimes promise to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee when promising to φ.
We do this when we say, as Roth says: “Don’t worry about it; I’ll take care of
everything. I promise.”18 But, natural as it is, this bit of language isn’t evidence
that when we promise to φ what we ordinarily implicitly promise is to φ-without-
any-help-from-the-promisee. Instead, this is a way of remarking on the fact that
we have a way, in the language, of promisors assuring promisees that what the
promisor means to be promising is φ-ing-without-any-help-from-the-promisee. But
if the default, normally implicit promise when a promisor promises to φ is a promise
to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee, we’d expect exactly the opposite thing to
be true. We would expect to find a way of marking out this promise as one (merely)
to φ, and not to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee. What we find instead is a
way of marking out this promise as one to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee
and not (merely) to φ. We find assurances where we wouldn’t expect to need them,
and don’t find hedges where we’d expect them to be. So, I don’t think we have any
reason to grant that when someone promises to φ what they ordinarily implicitly
promise is to φ-without-any-help-from-the-promisee.19
17Roth (2016, p. 97, emphasis added).
18ibid.
19The fact that promises to φ are not normally implicit promises to φ-without-any-help-from-the-
promisee doesn’t preclude there being independent reasons for promisees not to help promisors
φ. For instance, it might be that helping the promisor φ communicates a lack of trust in the
promisor’s ability to φ; or, relatedly, it might involve a failure to respect the promisor’s autonomy.
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Second: Even supposing promisors normally implicitly promise to φ-without-
any-help-from-the-promisee, this won’t make all the problems go away. Recall Cyril
and Salah. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that in making his promise to Salah
Cyril implicitly promises to make Salah breakfast without any help from Salah. This
fact doesn’t affect whether and to what extent it’s rational for Cyril to go on to
make promises to Jack and Jess to cook Salah breakfast. Of course, Cyril should
not (implicitly) promise Jack and Jess that he’ll make Salah breakfast without any
help from the promisees. For, the point of promising Jack and Jess, is to rationally
recruit them, via Accept-Promote, into making Salah breakfast. But the troubling
thing about the over-promising problem, as we saw, was not that Cyril will receive
help in fulfilling his promise to Salah. It was that the significance of the normative
relationship engendered by Cyril’s promise to Salah is distorted by the fact that
it’s always rational for Cyril to make these further promises and that Salah is in a
position to know this.
5. Summary
Accepting as Intending looks like a promising view about promissory acceptance. It
seems well-positioned to explain striking similarities between rational requirements
governing intention and promissory acceptance. But because the view identifies
promissory acceptance with intention, it entails that paraphrastic versions of ratio-
nal principles governing intention also govern promissory acceptance.20 In particu-
lar, it entails that since Intend-Promote governs intention, Accept-Promote governs
promissory acceptance. But Accept-Promote does not govern promissory accep-
tance. If it did, then promisees could be rationally enlisted into achieving promised
actions. This isn’t correct: if it were, then promissory acceptance wouldn’t be ca-
pable of serving the function it normally does in our deliberative economy. Perhaps
But the existence of reasons not to help the promisor φ won’t help the proponent of Accepting
as Intending, for the trouble with that view isn’t that it entails that reasons to help are never
outweighed. We can grant that they might be outweighed (e.g., by the reasons just mentioned).
The trouble with the view is that (absent the relevant explicit condition in the promise) it entails
the existence of the reasons to help in the first place. See §3 above. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for suggesting this point.
20Perhaps one could modify Roth’s account to say that promissory acceptance isn’t intending
that the promisor φ, but instead that the promisor be under an obligation to φ. This would
arguably avoid the troubling implications articulated here. I do not know whether Roth would
welcome such a modification, but I see two reasons for hesitation on his behalf. First, such a view
wouldn’t involve intending another agent’s action, a feature of Roth’s view he thinks is important,
and novel. Second, it’s not clear to me that such a view could do the work Roth puts to his original
view, especially when it comes to explaining Scanlon’s Expectation view (see §V of Roth (2016)).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
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worse, if Accept-Promote governed promissory acceptance, it would be rational for
a promisor to promise as many agents as could reasonably be expected to accept.
But, again, this isn’t correct: if it were, then the significance of the normative
relationship engendered by promise-making and promissory acceptance would be
radically distorted. So: It might turn out that promissory acceptance is closely
related to intention, but the former isn’t simply identical to the latter.
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